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WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY TO
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WHEN THE UNITED
STATES IS SUED AS ASSIGNEE OF A PRIVATE
CONTRACT
Sovereign immunity has long been a troublesome area of the law
because rules designed to shield the federal government from liability
come into conflict with substantive rules of law. One specific area of
this conflict is presented when the federal government is not an
original party to a contract, but becomes involved in a suit as the
assignee of one of the original contractors.
This situation arose in a recent Sixth Circuit decision-United
States v. P & D Coal Mining Co.' The Atomic Energy Commission
has the power to hire private companies to manage its installations.'
One such manager is the National Lead Company, employed by the
AEC to manage its project at Fernald, Ohio. In need of coal at
Fernald, National Lead, in 1955, entered into a one-year maximumminimum contract with the P & D Coal Mining Company. Payment
was to be made solely from Government funds. By the end of 1955
things were not going well; P & D refused to deliver more than the
minimum on its contract, and National Lead withheld payment on
some of the coal delivered, claiming P & D had breached.
Although the facts so far do not present an unusual situation, the
problem grows in complexity when the third party-the federal
government-is included. The contract provided for assignment to
the AEC and, in 1957, National Lead duly assigned its rights and
liabilities to the Commission. In 1962, the Government brought suit
against P & D for breach of contract, and P & D counterclaimed for
the withheld payments.
The district court dismissed the Government's claim. On
P & D's counterclaim, the court held the Government liable not only
for the principal amount but also for prejudgment interest' from the
date of the assignment to the Government.4 The court of appeals,
1358 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1966), aftirrning 251 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Ky. 1964).
2
Thus we find du Pont managing the Savannah River project and Union Carbide
running Oak Ridge.
3 Prejudgment interest can grow to a substantial sum. In this case P & D's
claim arose in 1955 and judgment was not final until 1966. Thus interest covers
eleven years and will, at 6% simple interest, amount to 66% of P & D's original
claim. Compare United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951)
(per curiam), where the Supreme Court reversed an award of interest on a claim
which arose in 1855.
4 It should be noted that, although no reason was given by either court, the
Government was not held liable for interest from the time the claim arose (when
the payments were withheld by National Lead) until the assignment was made two
years later.
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one judge dissenting, affirmed. The court of appeals held, without
citation, that, although the Government is not normally liable for prejudgment interest, the fact that the Government was not a party to
the original contract between National Lead and P & D changed this
result: a "mere assignment" ' to the Government could not compromise
P & D's otherwise assertable right to prejudgment interest. 6
The usual immunity of the United States from prejudgment interest is derived from the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The judicial
history of sovereign immunity has been extensively commented upon
elsewhere
For purposes of this Comment it is sufficient to note
that, while abandoning its unsuccessful efforts to justify the doctrine
5 358 F.2d at 621.
6 Implicit in the court's finding that the Government was not a party to P & D's
contract is a holding that National Lead, in its dealings with P & D, was not merely
acting for the Government as a purchasing agent without independent liability on
the contract. Were National Lead merely such an agent, there could have been no
assignment to the Government, as National Lead would have had no "rights or
obligations" to assign. Had this been the case, there would be no possible argument
that the normal rules of sovereign immunity be altered.
The agency issue has been reached by earlier courts in cases where the Government has attempted to have its contractors declared purchasing agents so that they
could escape state sales and use taxes. Although an AEC contractor has been held
immune from these taxes, as an agent, under circumstances similar to those in
P & D Coal, see United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959), aff'd
per curiam, 364 U.S. 281 (1960) (du Pont, the contractor, engaged for $1.00), the
Supreme Court has since narrowed considerably any immunity for an AEC contractor engaged for profit. See United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964), involving an AEC management contract at Oak Ridge which was practically indistinguishable from National Lead's contract. Although immunity from state sales taxes was
left unresolved in Boyd, id. at 45 n.6, it would be difficult to argue that National
Lead was an agent without liability on the P & D contract, even if it were an agent
for the purposes of state sales taxes.
It is settled by Boyd that National Lead could not enjoy general immunity as
a governmental instrumentality, and thus the issue reduces to whether it is immune
from liability on the particular contract as the Government's purchasing agent. But
this result is also precluded, as the Government tacitly admitted by failing to raise
the issue in P & D Coal. It is clear that in AEC contracts, as now written, the
principal contractor-National Lead-is liable to the supplier-P & D-on the contract. As the Government said in its brief in United States v. Davison Fuel &
Dock Co., appeal docketed, No. 10567, 4th Cir., 1966, arguing that for purposes of
the Walsh-Healey Act the United States was a party to the coal contract issued by
National Lead to P & D's successor: "[U]nlike the typical principal-agent situation,
National Lead, the agent, has liabilities under the Purchase Orders. Indeed, it
would seem that the initial liability to pay for the coal is on National Lead, the
Government being liable as purchaser of the coal only if National Lead fails to
make payment." Id. at 22. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Lyles & Lang
Constr. Co., 219 F.2d 328, 332-33, 341-42 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 956
(1955), where du Pont, which was held immune from state sales taxes in United
States v. Livingston, supra, was sued by one of its subcontractors, and the latter
recovered the amount due plus prejudgment interest.
Thus it can be said that a court, which was presented with the issue, would probably find the prerequisites to a valid assignment satisfied in the P & D Coal situation:
National Lead was initially liable, and there was a bona fide assignment to the
Government of the rights and obligations of a private party who had no immunities,
and who would have been liable on the contract before the assignment. Thus the
issue posed in P & D Coal, whether the assignment to the Government could waive
P & D's right to prejudgment interest, was squarely before the court.
7Pugh, Historical Approach .to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L.
REv. 476 (1953), and authorities cited therein.
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as applied in America, the Supreme Court has concluded that sovereign
immunity is an integral part of our legal heritage and the starting
point for any inquiry into suit against the Government.'
Once a court has determined that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable, the next question must be whether the Government
has consented to a waiver of immunity.' The Government cannot be
held liable unless it has waived immunity.
This method of analysis has been applied in the interest situation.
The Supreme Court has declared the "traditional rule" "0 to be that
the United States is liable for payment of interest on damages only
to the extent that it consents, and that consent can only be given by
statute or by authorized contract."
There are statutory waivers of
the Government's immunity from interest attendant to each of the
statutes conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear claims
against the Government. P & D brought its counterclaim under the
Tucker Act; 1 the applicable federal interest statutes allow only a
limited amount of interest against the United States, to run from the
time judgment becomes final."
The Supreme Court has held that
these interest statutes must be strictly construed,"4 and thus, because
the statutes do not expressly provide for prejudgment interest, there
is no statutory waiver in the P & D Coal situation.
Similarly, there was no contractual waiver of immunity by the
Government. Because there were no direct contractual dealings between the Government and P & D, P & D could only claim a contractual waiver of immunity to prejudgment interest as a third-party
8
United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940); Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C.,
306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) ; see Pugh, supranote 7, at 493-94.
9 See generally Pugh, supra note 7.
10 United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951) (per
curiam). For a criticism of this "traditional rule," see 33 VA. L. REv. 621 (1947).
lE.g., United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951) (per
curiam) ; United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659
(1947); United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585, 588 (1947).
1228 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), (c) (1964).
1328 U.S.C. §2411(b) (1964); 75 Stat. 416 (1961), 31 U.S.C. §724a (1964).
Section 2411 (b) provides:
[O]n all final judgments rendered against the United States in actions instituted under section 1346 of this title, interest shall be computed at the
rate of 4 per centum per annum from the date of the judgment up to, but
not exceeding, thirty days after the date of approval of any appropriation
Act for payment of the judgment.
Section 724a provides:
[W]henever a judgment of a district court to which the provisions of

section 2411(b)

. . . apply, is payable from this appropriation, interest

shall be paid thereon only when such judgment becomes final after review
on appeal or petition by the United States, and then only from the date of
the filing of the transcript thereof in the General Accounting Office to the
date of the mandate of affirmance (except that in cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court interest shall not be allowed beyond the term of the Court
at which the judgment was affirmed) . ...
14United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947);
United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585, 590 (1947).
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beneficiary of a contract between National Lead and the Government.
The Government did not expressly consent to pay P & D these charges
in either the master or the assignment contract.'- In this connection,
the agreement by the Government to assume all the "rights and
obligations" of the assignor does not constitute a contractual
waiver of its immunity from prejudgment interest. The cases are
clear that such waiver must be explicit; 1 when consent is not explicit,
waiver cannot be inferred.
Thus in P & D Coal there was no waiver of immunity within
the traditional categories of statute or authorized contracty The
P & D Coal court did not reject the concept that governmental consent
was a prerequisite to liability for interest, but rather found a new
exception to governmental immunity in this area. It derived this
exception from the law of assignment.
The initial appeal of this assignment argument is not difficult to
understand. Much of the rhetoric of assignment is aimed at making
the status of the assignee equivalent to that of the assignor."8 The
question becomes whether the law of assignment can be used to assault
the law of sovereign immunity. In order to answer this question, an
inquiry into the history of assignment to the Government is necessary.
Despite an early common law ban on the assignment of choses in
m
action, 9 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Buford,' upheld
assignments to and from the sovereign. The question posed in Buford
and in subsequent cases is the same as that posed in P & D Coal: What
rights or obligations does the Government acquire as the assignee of a
contract?
'5 Neither the court nor the parties mentioned such a provision; for the purposes of this Comment it is assumed that no such provision existed. For a discussion of the implications of a promise by the Government to National Lead in the
master contract to reimburse National Lead for amounts that might be assessed
against it, see text accompanying notes 44-47 infra.
16 See, e.g., United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654,
659 (1947).
17 One further exception to the Government's nonliability for interest occurs in
connection with the fifth amendment ban on the taking of private property without
just compensation. Interest is allowed from the time of the taking until the time
the claim is paid, as part of "just compensation," when the Government takes property by condemnation under its eminent domain power. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923). However, the cases have repeatedly distinguished the eminent domain situation from that essentially contractual in nature,
and have held that there is no constitutional right to interest in the latter situation.
United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585, 588 (1947) ; Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. United States, supra at 305; United States v. North Am. Co., 253
U.S. 330, 337 (1920). P & D Coal was a contract action and not an eminent
domain case, and there was no suggestion by the court that P & D had a constitutional right to prejudgment interest.
1sThus we find such recurrent aphorisms as: "The assignee stands in the
shoes of the assignor"; "The assignee takes subject .

no greater rights than the assignor."

193 WmLiSToN, CoxTRAcrs §405 (3d ed. 1960).
20 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 12 (1830).

.
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There have been two discernible lines of development in answer
to this question. Buford is the leading authority for the first line of
development. In Buford, by act of Congress, the Government had
accepted an assignment of a private claim, but the assignment was
not made until after the state statute of limitations on the contract had
run. Though state statutes of limitations do not normally run against
the United States, the Court held the Government's suit barred. On
the date of assignment, the assignor could not have sued on the claim
and "it can require no argument to show that the transfer of any
claim to the United States cannot give to it any greater validity than
it possessed in the hands of the assignor." 2
The rule established in Buford has been strictly followed. When
the United States recognized the Soviet Government in the RooseveltLitvinov Agreement of 1933, Russia assigned to the United States all
its rights in expropriated funds which had been in the United States
since the Russian Revolution. The cases held that the United States
2
acquired no greater rights than those possessed by the assignor.
Similarly, in United States v. Tayloras where the Government was
assigned the claim of a private creditor of defendant after the state
statute had run, the district court held the Government barred."
The second line of development deals with the situation where
the private claim assigned to the Government is free from any infirmities at the time of the assignment. The question then becomes
whether the Government's claim is still subject to any infirmities, such
as the running of a state statute of limitations, which may attach after
the assignment to the Government, despite the fact that the Government
is normally immune from these infirmities. The court in P & D Coal
21 Id. at 30.

See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938), where,
because the state statute of limitations had run against the Russians before they
assigned the claim, the United States was also barred from enforcing it. In United
States v. Belmont, 85 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 301 U.S.
324 (1937), the Second Circuit noted that a Russian claim would have been void
as it was against New York public policy to enforce a foreign state's expropriation
decree, and therefore held that the United States, as assignee of that claim, was
likewise barred. Accord, United States v. Bank of N.Y. & Trust Co., 77 F.2d 866
(2d Cir. 1935), aff'd, 296 U.S. 463 (1936) (the United States had no greater rights
than Russia to terminate state court proceedings and force an accounting in the
federal courts).
23 144 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
2
4 In accord are cases concerning the Government's statutory priority in bankruptcy proceedings. Since the rights of creditors become fixed at the date of filing
a bankruptcy petition, the rule is that when the United States takes an assignment
from the creditor after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy, the Government cannot
assert its priority. United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200 (1939); In re Hansen
Bakeries, Inc., 103 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1939); Federal Housing Adm'r v. Moore, 90
F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1937) (alternative ground) ; In re Byquist, 168 F. Supp. 483 (D.
Kan. 1958); In re Wissmeier, 26 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). But cf. Small
Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960), where, because 75% of
the debt was Government money, it was held that the United States was entitled to
priority despite the fact that it received the assignment after the debtor petitioned
for bankruptcy.
22
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apparently believed sovereign immunity was not applicable after the
assignment. All other cases which have faced this issue, however,
have held to the contrary.
The leading authority on this question is United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. ' 5 In that case, the United States became the
owner of bonds, as trustees for an Indian tribe, before the Tennessee
statute of limitations had run on the coupons. Suit was not commenced until after the statute had run. The Supreme Court permitted
a recovery by the Government:
[I]f the bar of the statute is not complete when the United
States become the owners and holders of the paper, it
appears to us . . . impossible to hold that the statute could
afterwards run against the United States. 6
Similarly, in United States v. Summnerlin,"7 the Federal Housing
Administration became the assignee of a private contract. As assignee
it filed a claim against the estate of the debtor, but not until after the
state statute of limitations had run. The Supreme Court stated
the rule:
When the United States becomes entitled to a claim, acting
in its governmental capacity, and asserts its claim in that
right, it cannot be deemed to have abdicated its governmental authority so as to become subject to a state statute
putting a time limitation upon enforcement."8
An analogous situation is presented in the federal tax laws, which
give the federal government liens against the property of tax defaulters.2 This includes the right to attach claims which the delinquent taxpayer has against his own private debtors. The question
presented has been whether the Government is entitled to enforce the
debt when it acquires the claim before the state statute runs, but
3
neglects to do so in time. In United States v. Jacobs," the court
allowed the Government to recover: "[T]he running of the state
statute of limitations is suspended at the moment when the Government
acquires the claim, or right, to the property." " In a similar case,
United States v. Polan Indus. Inc.,32 the court noted the two lines of
25 118 U.S. 120 (1885).
26Id. at 126.

27 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
281d. at 417.
29 INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 6321.

30 155 F. Supp. 182 (D.NJ. 1957).
31 Id. at 188.
32196 F. Supp. 333 (S.D. W. Va. 1961).
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development discussed above and held that the derivative nature of
the suit was relevant only at the moment of acquisition; following
acquisition of the claim by the Government, sovereign immunity was
waived only by express consent."
Although the cases considered above are factually distinguishable
from P & D Coal in that they do not deal specifically with the question
of prejudgment interest, there can be little question that these cases
should control the P & D Coal situation. We are dealing with the
question whether the law of assignment can be used to infer a waiver
by the United States of its sovereign immunity. In order to decide
this question, the crucial facts are the existence of an originally private
contract, and assignment of that contract to the Government. These
facts are present in the cases discussed above and also in P & D Coal,
thus rendering other factual distinctions of no consequence.
No argument can be made that the Government's immunity from
prejudgment interest is inherently less broad than other governmental
immunities, such as immunity from the operation of state statutes of
The cases on the Government's immunity from prelimitations.'
judgment interest-absent assignment-show that this immunity has
been rigidly enforced by the courts. In United States v. New York
Rayon Importing Co.,"3 the Court of Claims had awarded prejudgment
interest because it felt that the Comptroller General had withheld the
return of customs duties for an unreasonable length of time. The lower
court argued that this award of interest was in accord with sound
policy;

36

the Supreme Court unanimously reversed:

Courts lack the power to award interest against the United
States on the basis of what they think is or is not sound policy.
33Accord, United States v. Bush Constr. Co., 176 F. Supp. 524 (E.D.N.Y.
1959) (dictum) (taxpayer had assigned his claim against his debtor to the Government); United States v. Burke, 159 F. Supp. 458 (D. Md. 1958) (alternative
holding) (assignment to FHA).
Cases under the Bankruptcy Act have also followed this second line of development. When the Government becomes the assignee of a claim against a bankrupt
before the petition in bankruptcy is filed, the Government may assert its statutory
priority. United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941) (Government receives claim
before receiver appointed) ; Korman v. Federal Housing Adm'r, 113 F.2d 743 (D.C.
Cir. 1940); Wagner v. McDonald, 96 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1938); It re Riggs, 51
F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Pa. 1943) ; In re Weil, 39 F. Supp. 618 (M.D. Pa. 1941) ; In re
Cherry Valley Homes, Inc., 255 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1958) (alternative holding).
34 p & D's right to prejudgment interest is no more fundamental than a private
party's right to immunity after a state statute of limitations has run. Interest on a
claim was generally unknown at common law, and is awarded as prescribed by
statute. United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213 (1896) ; Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d
260 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Merchant's Fin. Co. v. Goldweber, 138 Ohio St. 474, 35 N.E.2d
779 (1941). Thus both interest on damages and governmental immunity to state
statutes of limitations are within the control of Congress, and may be changed by
Congress; no fundamental rights are at stake.
3 329 U.S. 654 (1947).
3664 F. Supp. 684, 687-88 (Ct. C1. 1946).
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or conWe reiterate that only express language in a statute
7
tract can justify the imposition of such interest
On the basis of the foregoing, the necessary conclusion is that
the court's disposition of the interest question in P & D Coal was
exactly backward. It was wrong to award prejudgment interest after
the date of the assignment, because the Government's immunity protected it. It was also wrong to refuse to award it for the period before
the assignment. The cases hold that the Government takes an assignment subject to all the equities and defenses then existing between the
assignor and the obligor; at the time of the assignment, one such
equity would be P & D's claim against National Lead for the accrued
interest. Had P & D sued National Lead before the assignment, it
could have recovered this interest; "8 by taking the assignment the
Government assumed this obligation.
Given the conclusion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
should prevent P & D from recovering prejudgment interest accruing
after the date of the assignment to the Government, however, it does
not necessarily follow that P & D or a party in a similar position is
therefore entirely precluded from recovering such interest. Common
law doctrines of assignment, independent of any consideration of
sovereign immunity, provide for the continuing liability of the
However, the assignor may be
assignor 3"on the contract assigned.'
relieved from liability when the obligor agrees, either in the original
contract or at a later time, to release the assignor from liability after
4
the assignment and to look only to the assignee for a recovery.
In the usual situation, where the obligor has not released the
assignor from liability, the obligor can ensure that he will recover all
prejudgment interest. Because interest on damages is an integral
part of the principal recovered, the general rule is that a separate
329 U.S. at 663.
in E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Lyles & Lang Constr. Co., 219 F.2d
328 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 956 (1955), plaintiff was a subcontractor for
du Pont at the AEC's Savannah River project with a contract similar to P & D's.
Although du Pont executed an assignment of the contract to the Government (as
the contract permitted) after suit was commenced, substitution of the United States
was denied. After recovering on its claim, the subcontractor was awarded prejudgment interest.
39 This discussion again presupposes that there was in fact a valid assignment
to the Government and thus that no principal-agent relation existed. See discussion
in note 6 vepra. Were the Government a principal, the alleged assignor would be its
agent, and thus not liable as an assignor.
4
oUrban v. Phy, 24 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1928) (dictum) ; Canister Co. v. National
Can Corp., 71 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Del.) (alternative holding), appeal dislnised,
163 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1947); Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating
Co., 147 Md. 588, 128 Atl. 280 (1925) (dictum) ; 4 CoIWiN, CONTRACTS § 866 (1951) ;
3 WiLLtsToN, CONTRACTS 18-19, 96-97 (3d ed. 1960); RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS
§ 160(4) (1932).
41 A. P. Freund Sons v. Vaupell, 53 Ill. App. 2d 1, 202 N.E.2d 350 (1964);
4 CORnIN, op. cit. supra note 40, at 456 & n.39; 3 WLLIsTox, op. cit. supra note 40,
§ 420.
37
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action cannot be maintained for interest.' Thus the obligor must get
a judgment for the whole amount-interest as well as principal-against
the assignor. The obligor, in P & D's situation, should sue the
assignor-National Lead-alone on the counterclaim, and leave it to

him to implead the Government or recover separately. The crucial
factor is bringing suit against the correct party-the assignor.4 3
In those cases where the obligor gets a judgment against the
assignor, there is a further problem as to the assignor's recourse against
the Government. Normally it is unimaginable that the Government
would jeopardize a valuable commercial relationship (as it had with
National Lead) to contest a single claim.' In the unlikely event that
the Government were to contest payment of interest, however, the
position of the assignor would be the same as that of any other party.
Typically the assignor would be operating under a contract indemnifying expenses (such as cost-plus-fixed-fee).
He would have to
establish that, under this contract, the Government had consented to a
waiver of its immunity to prejudgment interest,45 and in the absence
of such a contractual waiver,46 the assignor could not recover the full
interest charges from the Government. This result is not as harsh as
it may seem on first impression, because it is the assignor, not the
obligor, who has direct dealings with the Government. Thus the
assignor is generally the only party who can ensure that appropriate
47
contract clauses are included relieving him of any interest liability.

The court's action in P & D Coal may well have been the result
of judicial hostility to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In view
of the federal government's increasingly active role in the market
42 Stewart v. Barnes, 153 U.S. 456, 462-63

(1894); Ring Constr. Corp. v.

United States, 209 F.2d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1954) (dictum); Nelson v. Chicago
Mill & Lumber Corp., 76 F.2d 17, 23 (8th Cir. 1935) (dictum).
43 Cf. C. F. Harms Co. v. Erie R.R., 180 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1950) (per curiam),
where the plaintiff recovered both its interest and costs from the secondarily liable
party (the railroad) notwithstanding that the Government, which was primarily
liable on plaintiff's claim, C. F. Harms Co. v. Erie R.R., 167 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.
1948), was held immune from these charges.
44
However, where the dealings are not intimate but are more ad hoc in nature,
the Government has refused to pay interest and costs, leaving the other party to
assume these charges. C. F. Harms Co. v. Erie R.R., supra note 43.
45 The assignor would also face the requirement that the contractual waiver be
express and unambiguous. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
46
It has already been demonstrated that there is no operative statutory waiver.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
47 In cases where there is an authorized clause in the contract between the
assignor and the Government, binding the Government to pay interest charges
(and perhaps costs) which might be assessed against the assignor, and where the
assignor is still liable on the assigned contract, there would seem to be no impediment
to the obligor's dispensing with a suit against the assignor and suing the Government directly as a third-party beneficiary. There can be little question that such
a provision favors the obligor as much as would a direct promise. A direct suit in
this situation would have the added beneficial result of preventing a wasteful circuity
of actions.
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place, it is probably desirable that the Government as a contractor be
treated as a private party, at least to some extent. Any relaxation of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, should be by the legislature,48 not by the courts. The law of assignment does not support
the exception formulated by the court in P & D Coal.
48 It should be added that in addition to Congress, a change in the Government's
policy on prejudgment interest may also be effected in certain cases by an administrative agency. As the interest cases hold, the Government's immunity to prejudgment interest may be waived by an authorized contract. What constitutes an
authorized contract--one within the authority of the contracting officer-is beyond
the scope of this Comment, but provided a contractual waiver would be authorized,
an argument that immunity from prejudgment interest is contrary to good policy
may be addressed to the appropriate agency.

